New book – Scotland’s Shame: Why Lockerbie Still Matters

My new book Scotland’s Shame: Why Lockerbie Still Matters will be published by Birlinn on 3 October. It features a remarkable foreword by Dr Jim Swire.

The advance blurb says:

The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over the small Scottish town of Lockerbie in December 1988 was one of the most notorious acts of terrorism in recent history. Its political and foreign policy repercussions have been enormous, and twenty-five years after the atrocity in which 270 lost their lives, debate still rages over the conviction of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, as well as his controversial release on compassionate grounds by Scotland’s SNP government in 2009. John Ashton argues that the guilty verdict, delivered by some of Scotland’s most senior judges, was perverse and irrational, and details how prosecutors withheld numerous items of evidence that were favourable to Megrahi. It accuses successive Scottish governments of turning their back on the scandal and pretending that the country’s treasured independent criminal justice system remains untainted. With numerous observers believing the Crown Office is out of control and the judiciary stuck in the last century, politicians must address these problems or their aspirations for Scotland to become a modern European social democracy are bound to fail.

I hope to have details of the launch soon.

 

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Information is free but everywhere it is in chains

On 18 February this year I sent the following request to the Crown Office press office, which forwarded it to the CO’s freedom of information unit:

I am writing about the Lockerbie bombing and would be grateful if the Crown Office would answer some questions about the following important items of documentary evidence.

PT/82 and PT/88

These documents contain the results of tests conducted on various pieces of Lockerbie debris at the Royal Armaments Research and Development Establishment (RARDE). PT/82 contains, inter alia, results of metallurgy tests conducted on the fragment of circuit board PT/35b, while PT/88 contains, inter alia, the results of similar tests conducted on a control sample circuit board, DP/347a, which the police had obtained from the Swiss company Mebo and which was from the same manufacturing batch as those used in the Mebo timers that were supplied to Libya. The tests established that there was a very significant dissimilarity between the two items, namely, that the circuitry of PT/35b was plated with pure tin, whereas the circuitry on DP/347a was plated with an alloy of 70% tin and 30% lead. The documents each contain a handwritten note by RARDE scientist Allen Feraday, dated 1.8.91, which confirm the results. The pure tin plating of PT/35b would have required an entirely different manufacturing process to that used to plate DP/347a. Together the two documents contradict Mr Feraday’s claim, which he made in his forensic report for the Crown and repeated in evidence at trial, that PT/35b’s ‘materials and tracking pattern’ were ‘similar in all respects’ to those of DP/347a. The documents each have a Dumfries and Galloway police label dated 8 November 1999.

Questions:

1) Were the documents passed by the police to the prosecution team prior to the trial of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi and Lamin Fhimah?

2) If they were, why were they not disclosed to the defence?

3) Who made the decision not to disclose the documents to the defence?

D8624

This document contains, inter alia, two versions of a memorandum from Detective Inspector William Williamson to Senior Investigating Officer Stuart Henderson, the first dated 16.3.90 and the second 3.9.90. Both of these reported upon scientific tests conducted on PT/35b as part of the investigation of its origin. Both state:

‘Without exception it is the view of all experts involved in the PCB [printed circuit board] Industry who have assisted with this enquiry that the tin application on the tracks of the circuit was by far the most interesting feature. The fact that pure tin rather than a tin/lead mixture has been used is very unusual.’ 

None of the material disclosed to the defence pre-trial contained similar references to the fact that PT/35b’s pure tin plating was ‘very unusual’. 

Questions:

4) Was D8624 passed by the police to the prosecution team pre trial?

5) If it was, why was it not disclosed to the defence?

6) Who made the decision not to disclose it to the defence?

Statement S3743A by Detective Inspector Watson McAteer

In this statement DI McAteer reported:

‘About 1000 hours on Friday, 22nd September, 1989, along with the B.K.A. Airport enquiry team and F.B.I. special agent Whittaker, I visited the V3 interline station, located within the airfield at Frankfurt Airport. During the course of this visit I observed two operators using Gate Number 206.  These operators worked as a team with one unloading baggage from the wagon onto the conveyor belt which feeds through to his colleague who remains seated within the coding gate booth.  The coder then examined the luggage Tags on each piece of luggage prior to keying the details into the computer system.  After completing this task, when the wagon had been completely unloaded, the coder entered the details on a work sheet located next to the key board within the coding gate.  When this particular operation had been completed both workers walked away from the gate leaving it completely unattended, with the computer switched on and operable.  Within the space of one minute, I observed a V3 worker carry a single suitcase from a batch located some fifty yards from gate 206 to that particular gate.  This worker entered gate 206 coding booth and after keying details into the computer sent the single piece of luggage into the system.  This operation was started and completed in less than fifteen seconds with no entry being made on the work sheet which was still in situ within the gate. Through F.B.I. agent Whittaker I questioned the F.A.G. supervisor Herr Zimmerman regarding this practice.  Herr Zimmerman reluctantly agreed that such a practice was not unusual.’

At trial the defence called Mr Whittaker as a witness and questioned him about this incident. When asked if he mentioned the incident to anyone, Mr Whittaker said only that he had discussed it with DI McAteer and, within a day or two, the BKA.   Under cross-examination by Advocate Depute Alan Turnbull QC, he said he couldn’t be certain that the baggage handler who keyed in the single item of baggage had not filled out the worksheet.  Asked, ‘Do I take it that you would not be close enough to see whether this particular worker made an entry in a notebook?’ he replied, ‘It would be very likely that that could have been missed, yes.’

If the prosecution team had been in possession of S3743A, they should have been aware that: a) DI McAteer expressed no doubts that baggage handler who keyed in the single item had not recorded the transaction on the worksheet; b) according to DI McAteer, Mr Whittaker discussed the incident, not only, with the BKA, but also with a FAG supervisor; and c) according to DI McAteer, the supervisor described the practice as not unusual – a very significant admission when viewed in context.

If the statement had been disclosed to the defence, they would have been able to challenge Mr Whittaker’s evidence and make stronger submissions in respect of the possibility that the primary suitcase was ingested at Frankfurt airport.

Questions:

7) Was S3743A passed by the police to the prosecution team pre trial?

8) If it was, why was it not disclosed to the defence either before, or after, Mr Whittaker testified?

9) Who made the decision not to disclose it?

I look forward to your response.

Yours sincerely,

John Ashton. 

Under the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act, the Crown Office should have responded within 20 working days, unless it needed to consider the public interest test, in which case it should have informed me within that 20-day limit. It failed to respond until 19 June, when it sent me this refusal notice from John Logue, the senior procurator fiscal for the East of Scotland, who was formerly a member of the Lockerbie prosecution team.  The key passage reads:

We do endeavour to provide information whenever possible. However, in this instance an exemption under section 34(1)(a) of the 2002 Act applies to all the information requested.

The exemption covers information which has been held by a Scottish public authority for the purpose of an investigation into criminal matters whether the public body is the prosecuting authority or has an obligation to make a report to the Procurator Fiscal. In particular, it exempts information which at any time has been used for the purposes of:

• an investigation an authority has a duty to conduct to ascertain whether a person should be prosecuted for an offence;

• an investigation which may lead to a report to the procurator fiscal in connection with possible criminal proceedings; and

• criminal proceedings instituted in consequence of such a report.

Your questions relate to the steps taken by Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary and the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in relation to four documents during the preparation of the prosecution of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi for the Lockerbie bombing and murder of 270 people. Information held in relation to the submission of evidence to the Procurator Fiscal and its consideration for disclosure is information which falls within the terms of section 34(1)(a).

As the exemption is conditional we have applied the ‘public interest test’. This means we have, in all the circumstances of this case, considered if the public interest in disclosing the information outweighs the public interest in applying the exemption. We have found that, on balance, the public interest lies in favour of upholding the exemption. While we recognise that there is some public interest in release because it relates to the Lockerbie bombing which remains a significant event in Scotland and to Mr Megrahi’s conviction, this is outweighed by the public interest in withholding information because of the ongoing criminal investigation into the involvement of others with Mr Megrahi in the bombing and the possibility of further legal proceedings in relation to Mr Megrahi’s conviction.

The ‘possibility of further legal proceedings in relation to Mr Megrahi’s conviction’ is presumably a reference to the current police investigation into the complaints of alleged criminal misconduct made by the committee of Justice for Megrahi. Revealing why the documents were not disclosed, and who made the decisions, could not possibly jeopardise ‘the ongoing criminal investigation into the involvement of others’. It might well, of course, jeopardise the reputations of the Crown Office and its officers.

I am entitled to request an internal review of the refusal, but the likelihood of one of Logue’s colleagues overturning his decision is minimal. Section 47(1) of the act allows a right to appeal internal review decisions to the Scottish Information Commissioner, however, handily for the Crown Office, section 48 exempts it from that provision. In other words, the Crown Office is the final arbiter of whether or not its information should be made public. No other Scottish public authority enjoys this privilege.

The current issue of Private Eye carries the following article on the story:

Nearly 25 years after the Lockerbie bombing, the Scottish authorities are still sitting on material which may help uncover the truth about the worst terrorist atrocity on UK soil, killing 270 people.

Freedom of information requests to the Crown Office, aimed at uncovering how and why the trial of Abdelbasset al-Megrahi came to be seriously misled over the key piece of forensic evidence — a tiny piece of bomb fragment recovered from the Pan Am 103 crash site — have been turned down “in the public interest”.

It is now 18 months since new scientific evidence came to light which, in effect, destroyed both the prosecution case against Megrahi and any direct link to Libya itself.  Two experts, Dr Chris McArdle and Dr Jess Cawley, showed that the fragment of bomb timing device circuitboard said at the trial to match those known to have been supplied to Libya was different. The plating metal on the debris fragment was of pure tin, while on the boards in Libyan timers it was a tin/lead mix.

Further police and prosecution documents released under disclosure to Megrahi’s lawyers, just weeks before his controversial return to Libya, showed that it was known at the time that there was no match.  Yet government scientist Allen Feraday claimed on behalf of the Crown during the trial that the materials and tracking pattern on both boards were “similar in all respects”.

The documents suggesting otherwise were never disclosed to the trial, nor to Megrahi’s defence team — as they should have been. Details only emerged in the book Megrahi: You are my Jury by John Ashton, a researcher, writer and one of the Libyan’s defence team. Ashton has since been trying to find out whether the material gathered by Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary was kept secret by the police or passed to the Crown and prosecution team.

Last week Ashton’s hopes that FOI legislation would provide some answers were dashed when the Crown Office cited an exemption under section 34 of the 2002 Act, protecting evidence gathered as part of a criminal investigation. It said the public interest in releasing the material was “outweighed by the public interest in withholding information because of the ongoing criminal investigation into the involvement of others with Mr Megrahi in the bombing and the possibility of further legal proceedings in relation to Mr Megrahi’s conviction”.

The hope is that the Scottish authorities are taking seriously allegations of misconduct levelled against some of those involved in the investigation and prosecution.  The allegations come in a report by the Justice for Megrahi campaign group that has been handed to Dumfries and Galloway police.

The Scottish justice committee at Holyrood earlier this month asked ministers what resources had been committed to investigating the campaign’s allegations.  The justice committee fell short of demanding a public inquiry into the conviction, but it did ask ministers to report back on their powers to appoint an independent investigator.  Watch this space.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Geoffrey Robertson QC on Megrahi’s right to silence

I have just come across the following passage about the Lockerbie trial in the latest edition Geoffrey Robertson QC’s book Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (pages 665-6). My comments follow.

The importance of the trial was that it established, to the satisfaction of three experienced Scots judges (and five more on appeal) that the bomb was planted by an agent of Libya, not by terrorist groups supported by Iran or Syria. The open and adversarial nature of the proceedings also served the interests of truth – in particular by subjecting the CIA’s star witness to a cross-examination which comprehensively destroyed his credibility, and through painstaking forensic science, which found tell-tale clues in tiny fragments which fell from 31,000 feet (the ‘made in Malta’ label from the Babygro jumpsuit covering the suitcase bomb). The reasoned verdict proved important, not least because it has informed subsequent debate over the correctness of Al-Megrahi’s conviction.

Lockerbie stands as an important acknowledgement in state practice of the overriding importance of bringing terrorists to justice. It also provides a good example of why international criminal courts should abolish the so-called ‘ right of silence’. Al-Megrahi was too craven to enter the witness box to face cross-examination, later claiming that his lawyers advised him to remain silent. This may well have been because they feared his guilt would have been exposed had he done so, but as a matter of morality, whenever a court holds that the prosecution has established a prima facie case of mass murder against the defendant, the relatives of victims and the public should be entitled to an explanation. If he refuses to take the opportunity to testify, his refusal should be a factor in the assessment of whether he is guilty. Al-Megrahi’s supporters who claim that ‘he always asserted his innocence’ overlook the fact that he failed to assert it at the appropriate time, namely in the witness box at his trial. The ‘right to silence’ is a valuable protection to suspects against being forced to incriminate themselves in police stations after their arrest but is inappropriate at the trial, by which time they will have had years of legal advice to prepare themselves for cross-examinations. The so-called ‘right’ has been abolished in England, where it originated, but not in any international court.

Before discussing Robertson’s view of the Megrahi’s right to silence, it’s worth noting some of the serious omissions from his account.

1. For a trial to operate openly and in the interests of truth, all relevant evidence should be disclosed to the defence. As Robertson well knows, it was not. The SCCRC report and my book (which Roberston confirmed, during a debate on BBC 5 Live on 21 May last year, that he had read) revealed that numerous items of vital documentary evidence had been withheld from the defence. Indeed, four of the SCCRC’s six grounds of referral concerned such non-disclosure.

2. The five appeal court judges did not conclude that the bomb was planted by an agent of Libya and not by terrorist groups supported by Iran or Syria. Rather, they simply rejected the defence’s submissions. Moreover, in doing so the judges made clear in paragraph 369 of their judgment that they had ‘not had to consider whether the verdict of guilty was one which no reasonable trial court, properly directing itself, could have returned in the light of that evidence.’

3. Defence counsel were only able to destroy the credibility of the CIA’s star witness, Majid Giaka, because they pushed for the disclosure of redacted sections of CIA cables about Giaka. The Lord Advocate had earlier told the court, entirely wrongly, that those sections contained nothing that bore upon Giaka’s credibility.

4. As Robertson should also know, the ‘painstaking forensic science’ examined at trial did not include the results of crucial metallurgy tests, which proved that the fragment of circuit board, which, according to the Crown, originated from one of a batch of Mebo timers supplied to Libya, was different to boards used in those timers.

5. The ‘reasoned verdict’ was condemned as ‘incomprehensible’ by UN trial observer Professor Hans Kochler, and has been criticized by numerous other senior international jurists and Scottish legal experts. Moreover, the SCCRC concluded that it was ‘at least arguably, one which no reasonable court, properly directed, could have returned.’ The judges were satisfied that Megrahi bought the clothes that ended up in the bomb suitcase on 7 December, his only window of opportunity, however, the SCCRC said: ‘The Commission does not consider there to be any reasonable basis for the trial court’s conclusion that the purchase took place on 7 December 1988 and therefore for the inference it drew that the applicant was the purchaser of the items from Mary’s House’. This was almost as good as saying that it considered, not only the judgment to be unreasonable, but also the guilty verdict itself.

As for the right to silence, Megrahi was not ‘too craven’ to give evidence, in fact he was quite prepared to. It is undisputed fact – not merely a claim by Megrahi – that his lawyers advised him against it. As Robertson knows, one of the main reasons for this advice was that, a few days after being charged with the bombing, Megrahi had lied in an interview with American TV channel ABC, which he had been falsely assured would not touch upon the prosecution case. He did so, he said, because he feared that, if he confirmed certain aspects of the case, such as his presence in Malta under a false passport, it might provide a pretext for the US government to attack Libya, something it had done five years earlier in response to a much smaller terrorist attack (see pages 11-12 of Megrahi: You are my Jury). It would be a difficult point for any defendant to argue against a ferocious Crown counsel. Megrahi’s difficulty would have been all the greater because he would have to testify in his second language, or via a translator.

The SCCRC gave detailed consideration to Megrahi’s untested defence and numerous other matters that might be considered unfavourable to him. It concluded that, cumulatively, they did not provide a basis for refusing his application for referral.

The fact that Robertson clearly does not believe Megrahi’s story, I suspect, says more about how far removed he is from other people’s realities than it does about Megrahi’s guilt or innocence (he has never, as far as I’m aware, lived under the threat of air strikes). More importantly, if he doesn’t believe the story, then why would equally unworldly judges? The right to silence is, inter alia, a safeguard against such failures of understanding. It exists – or, in England, existed – because the burden of proof is, properly, with the Crown and no defendant need contribute to their own prosecution. That a human rights advocate of Robertson’s stature should advocate its abolition, is as bewildering as it is alarming.

In an endnote, Robertson writes:

Al-Megrahi’s latest self-serving defence is set our in John Ashton, Megrahi You Are My Jury (Birlinn, 2012). But if the bomb was loaded in Malta, the circumstantial case against him remains, without a credible answer.

Isn’t a defence supposed to be self-serving, Geoffrey? Setting this aside, he ignores the fact that, at Megrahi’s insistence, the book set out the case for the prosecution as well as the defence, including evidence not heard at trial. Furthermore, Megrahi requested that I publish the SCCRC report on his case, even though it contained facts and opinions that were unfavourable to him.

The Malta point is utter nonsense. As Robertson should know, even if the bomb was loaded at Malta’s Luqa airport (a possibility that’s all but ruled out by documentary evidence from the airport) the circumstantial case against Megrahi is exceptionally weak. The two main strands of that case are 1) that on 7 December 1988 he bought the clothes at Tony Gauci’s shop, which were subsequently packed in the bomb suitcase; and 2) that a fragment of circuit board recovered from one of the garments was part of a bomb timer that had been supplied to Libya by Swiss company Mebo, whose Zurich offices were shared by a company in which Megrahi was a partner. Gauci consistently described the clothes purchaser as around 50, 6ft tall, heavily built and dark skinned. Megrahi was considerably younger, smaller and lighter skinned. Furthermore, as the SCCRC recognised, meteorological and other evidence ruled out 7 December as the purchase date. Forensic evidence, which, despite being available since the early 1990s, was not disclosed to the trial court, proves that the circuit board fragment could not have originated from a Libyan timer.

For what it’s worth, in my view Robertson has put so much energy into the promotion of international justice that he is blind to the possibility that it can so spectacularly miscarry.  More generally, he displays the depressing tendency of the commentariat to put opinions before the evidence. It’s a trait that’s all the more lamentable in a senior jurist.

 

 

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New Private Eye article

The latest edition of Private Eye carries the following article:

David Cameron and Scottish police and prosecutors hoping to unearth material relating to the 1988 Lockerbie bombing have all left Tripoli empty-handed. Libyan justice minister Salah al-Marghani told the Telegraph last week: “The matter was settled with the Gaddafi regime. I am trying to work on the current situation rather than dig into the past.”

While the Scottish Authorities are, by contrast, trying to put an upbeat spin on last month’s meetings with Libyan ministers and officials, saying they hoped for further progress, the apparent break should give Dumfries and Galloway detectives time to follow up more tangible leads. It is more than a year since new forensic evidence came to light which in effect destroyed not only the prosecution case against Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, but also any positive links to Libya itself. Police have still not been to see the two UK scientists whose findings come from a re-examination of crash debris. Dr Jim Swire, who has campaigned tirelessly find out exactly how his daughter, Flora, came to die in the bombing, and who was responsible, is now preparing a case for a full independent inquiry, calling the police, Crown and government failure to properly investigate the new evidence a ‘dereliction of duty’.

Eye readers may remember two experts, Dr Chris McArdle and Dr Jess Cawley, showed that the most important forensic evidence recovered from the debris of Pan Am 103 – a fragment of timing device circuit board said to match those known to have been supplied to Libya – was in fact fundamentally different. The plating metal on the two boards was different. On the debris fragment, it was pure tin and on the boards used in the Libyan timers, it was a tin/lead mix.

The new evidence would have formed a major part of Megrahi’s appeal, had he not – because of his advanced cancer –    abandoned it in order to return to Libya to die with his family. Instead it was detailed in the book, ‘Megrahi: You are my Jury’, by John Ashton, a researcher, writer and one of the Libyan’s defence team. But if the blast fragment was no match for Libyan timers, where or who did it come from?

Cameron will no doubt continue to avoid calls for an inquiry by maintaining that Scottish police are “looking further into the issues around the Lockerbie bomb”, and protracted wranglings with the Libyans buys more time. It is, of course, always possible that detectives could unearth some material in Libya that provides a link to Gaddafi and the sophisticated plot to blow up a passenger aircraft – he was, after all, no stranger to state-sponsored terrorism.

Ever since the dictator’s overthrow, various Libyan defectors and politicians, including Mustafa Abdel Jalil, Gaddafi’s former justice minister who later headed of Libya’s National Transitional Council, have promised “proof” of Gaddafi’s involvement. And yet it has still not been forthcoming. 

Another was Moussa Koussa, Gaddafi’s intelligence chief at the time of Lockerbie and the man who London and Washington always claimed was behind the atrocity. After his defection he was interviewed in London by Scottish police. But curiously for a man, once thought to be a mass murderer, his assets were unfrozen and he was allowed to leave the country.  Newspaper reports suggested that Koussa had in fact long been a useful MI6 asset, which if true, just raises more questions about the government’s approach to Lockerbie.

The only Lockerbie-related document confirmed to have come out of Tripoli since the revolution is a private letter from Megrahi himself, written while he was in jail, to Libya’s then intelligence chief and Gaddafi’s right hand man, Abdullah al-Senussi.  It was found by Wall Street Journal staff among other “apparently untouched” papers in Senussi’s ransacked office. In it Megrahi maintains his innocence, claiming fraudulent information had been passed to investigators by “Libyan collaborators” and saying British and American investigators ignored “foul play” and irregularity.  He gives details of his lawyers’ efforts to prove his innocence.

That Megrahi should seek to convince of his innocence, the very hit man who should have known all about the bombing and who carried it out, (if the Crown’s case is correct) again raises fundamental questions about the conviction.

As Jim Swire says in the latest of a series of letters to David Cameron, the Crown Office and the Scottish government, last month:  “There is thus now no remaining credible link between the take off of the Lockerbie flight from Heathrow airport with the bomb on board, and the island of Malta, or the hand of Megrahi. It is now over 24 years since my daughter Flora was murdered at Lockerbie. As her father I have a right to know who murdered her and why her life was not protected. Such lethargy as this is intolerable”.

 

 

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A tale of two governments

On this, the 24th anniversary of the Lockerbie bombing, comes a remarkable story, courtesy of the BBC. It carries the encouraging headline Lockerbie bombing: Libyan government set to release files. The first sentence reads: ‘The new Libyan government in Tripoli is prepared to open all files relating to the Lockerbie bombing, the country’s ambassador to the UK has confirmed.’ There’s nothing especially new here: the Libyan government, and the National Transitional Council before it, have always made the right noises about cooperating with the Scottish police investigation. It’s the next sentence that is so surprising: ‘However, Mahmud Nacua said it would be at least another year before Libya was in a position to release whatever information it holds.’ The article explains: ‘Mr Nacua told the BBC no formal agreement had yet been reached, but that Libya would open the files it holds on the case. He said that would only come when his government had fully established security and stability – a process he believes will take at least a year.’

Of course, the new government has to establish security and stability and, of course, it has other pressing priorities, but in a year’s time it will be almost two and a half years since the old regime fell. Locating and handing over whatever files exist should be a relatively quick and straightforward matter, which should not interfere with the nation building process.

Why, then, is the government stalling? In my view, the most likely explanation is that it has no evidence that the old regime was behind the bombing. If ever there was evidence, it would probably have been shredded a long time ago. I believe it’s rather more likely that there never was such evidence. While I doubt anyone in the new government will be prepared to say this publicly, there are plenty of senior officials who are aware that the case against Abdelbaset al-Megrahi was a sham (and, of course, as things stand, the case against Abdelbaset is the case against the Gadafy regime).

The new government is potentially in a very awkward position, as during the 2011 revolution the NTC played the Lockerbie card in the propaganda war against Gadafy. It would be very difficult for it to now admit that it had no evidence of the old regime’s involvement. And it would be especially embarrassing for former NTC chair Mustafa Abdel Jalil, who claimed to have proof that the dictator ordered the bombing. (It’s worth remembering that when pressed on BBC Newsnight about the evidence, the best he could come up with was that Gadafy’s government had paid Abdelbaset’s legal bills, a fact that was both widely known and, more importantly, completely non-incriminating. I have written more about Jalil’s and other Gadafy regime defectors’ claims here.)

That said, I have a good deal of sympathy with the Libyan government, which is caught in the middle of a mess that, for the most part, is not of its own making. I cannot say the same of the Scottish government, which continues to dig an ever-deeper hole for itself. The latest shovel load comes in a letter I received yesterday from the criminal law and licensing division of the government’s justice directorate, in response to a freedom of information request.

I made the request to get to the bottom of why the government has repeatedly gone out of its way to say that it does not doubt the safety of Abdelbaset’s conviction, even after the publication of the SCCRC’s statement of reasons, which, lest we forget, found six possible grounds for a miscarriage of justice. In response to my original request, the government confirmed that the justice secretary, Kenny McAskill, had read the statement of reasons and that Alex Salmond was provided with a briefing on its contents. You can read the response and the appended documents here. It contained the following statement:

It might be helpful for me to clarify Scottish Ministers’ position concerning the safety of Mr Al-Megrahi’s conviction. Scottish Ministers have stated repeatedly their view that as Mr Al-Megrahi was conyicted in a court of law, that a court remains the only appropriate forum for considering the evidence and determining his guilt or innocence. Following consideration of all relevant matters, only a court has the power to either uphold or overturn Mr Al-Megrahi’s conviction. It remains open for relatives of Mr Al-Megrahi or, potentially, relatives of the Lockerbie bombing victims, to ask the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission to refer the case to the court for a further appeal and Ministers have made clear they would be comfortable if this were to happen.

This prompted me to write back as follows:

Your letter points out that the government has stated that a court remains the only appropriate forum for considering the evidence and determining Mr Megrahi’s guilt or innocence. While this is true, it is also the case that the government has repeatedly stated that it does not doubt the safety of Mr Megrahi’s conviction. It is very unusual for a government to take a partisan stance on a conviction that has been referred to the appeal court. This issue was at the heart of my information request, yet is not addressed in your letter.

I would therefore like to know:

1) Why did the government consider it necessary to express the view that it did not doubt the safety of Mr Megrahi’s conviction, rather than simply stating that it was for the courts to determine the safety of the conviction?

2) Why did it consider it necessary to publicly hold to that view after the publication of the statement of reasons and the reading of the statement by Mr MacAskill?

3) Why does Mr MacAskill not doubt the safety of the conviction when the SCCRC found six grounds to doubt its safety?

In yesterday’s letter, which you can read here, the government could offer only the following shameful dissembling response:

As you will be aware, it is not a role of the Scottish Government to investigate allegations that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Any person who alleges that they have been a victim of a miscarriage of justice may apply to the SCCRC, which was established in 1999 to review cases where it is alleged that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, either in respect of a conviction or sentence. Where, following investigation, the SCCRC concludes that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred and that it is in the interests of justice to do so, it will refer the case to the High Court for determination. Mr Al-Megrahi, as you know, chose to abandon his appeal before it was determined by the High Court.

In general terms, in the absence of any court decision quashing a person’s conviction, it would not be appropriate for the Scottish Government to call into question the safety of any conviction which is why it was appropriate for the Scottish Government to state that it did not doubt Mr Al-Megrahi’s conviction as the conviction was at the time of such statements (and indeed continues to be) a matter of court record. We have also made clear that a court remains the only appropriate forum for determining Mr Al-Megrahi’s guilt or innocence and explained the process by which a further appeal could be heard by the court in this case.

This begs the question, if it would be inappropriate for the government to call into question the safety of the conviction, why does it consider it appropriate to state that it does not doubt the safety of the conviction? There is a world of difference between it saying that Abdelbaset’s conviction was a matter of court record, and it saying that it does not doubt the safety of the conviction. The former is a neutral statement of fact, whereas the latter is a highly contentious opinion, which, in my view, represents political interference in the appeal process (although Abdelbaset abandoned his appeal, as the government well knows, his family might launch a fresh application to the SCCRC).

Why did the Scottish government decide to nail its colours to the prosecution mast? In my view it’s because it daren’t admit that Scotland’s foremost independent institution, its criminal justice system (the prosecution arm of which is headed by McAskill’s cabinet colleague, the Lord Advocate), made a hash of the UK’s biggest ever murder case.

 

 

 

 

 

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Wigtown Book Festival

I shall be speaking at the Wigtown Book Festival this Saturday, October 6th, at 12 noon in the Baillie Gifford Marque. Tickets are £8.

 

 

 

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Latest news from Malta

I was interviewed this morning on BBC Good Morning Scotland about the yesterday’s story in the Times of Malta. The interview is available on BBC iPlayer for the next seven days here (UK only). It starts at around 2:09:00.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Response to Magnus Linklater article

Today’s Scottish edition of the Times contains the following comment piece by Magnus Linklater, with whom I had an exchange of views at the Edinburgh Book Festival event on Saturday. My response to the paper’s letters editor is further below.

 

A remarkable thing happened at the Edinburgh Book Festival on Saturday. Eight senior Scottish judges were accused of presiding over a major miscarriage of justice in the Lockerbie affair — and a packed Scottish audience applauded.

That trust in the judiciary should have descended to this level says much about the way that the long saga of this terrorist atrocity has evolved. A determined campaign to absolve the convicted bomber, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, of guilt, has succeeded to the extent that not only does it appear to have swayed public opinion in his favour, it has also undermined confidence in the most important legal process Scotland has been involved in since the Second World War.

The man who lodged the accusation was Hans Köchler, the UN observer at the Lockerbie trial. He believes that the judges, both at the original trial, and the appeal, were prepared to overlook flawed evidence to ensure a conviction. His fellow panel members, Jim Swire, whose daughter died in the bombing, and the writer John Ashton, who has ghosted al-Megrahi’s own account of the affair, agreed.

They believe not only that the evidence was deliberately manipulated at the trial, but that, from the outset, there was a conspiracy to point the finger at Libya and divert attention from the real instigator, Iran.

Yet that contention has never been challenged in any detail. Because the trial judges and the Crown Office, Scotland’s prosecution service, are bound by convention to remain silent, the counter-argument has gone by default so that we have only heard one side of the case. The opportunity of a second appeal, which might have tested the allegations, was abandoned by al-Megrahi himself when he was released on compassionate grounds and returned to Libya.

But the case mounted by the pro-Megrahi campaigners is every bit as flawed as the one it seeks to dismantle. To demonstrate that Libya was framed, they have to prove that there was a calculated decision to do so. That decision would have had to lead to the planting or suppression of forensic evidence, the control of witnesses by intelligence services, the approval of senior politicians, the complicity of police officers, a prosecution team prepared to bend every rule to secure a conviction, and a set of senior Scottish judges willing to go along with that.

This last contention is perhaps the most controversial. As Brian McConnachie, a senior Scottish QC, puts it: “The idea that eight Scottish judges took part in a deliberate manipulation of evidence for political reasons is simply preposterous.” But for the conspiracy theorists, who have excluded reason and logic, the preposterous is all that remains.

 

 

Dear Sir or Madam,

Magnus Linklater’s article in today’s Scottish edition of the Times, ‘Has Scotland really swallowed this crazy conspiracy?’, misrepresents my position on the conviction of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi. It claims that I, and certain others who believe that Mr Megrahi was wrongly convicted of the Lockerbie bombing, have alleged a grand conspiracy to frame him and Libya, in which the police, the Crown Office, witnesses, judges, senior politicians and the intelligence services were all complicit. As I pointed out to Mr Linklater at the Edinburgh Book Festival on Saturday, had he read my book, Megrahi: You are my Jury, carefully, he would know that I have done no such thing.

Like the majority of Mr Linklater’s fellow audience members on Saturday, I have not swallowed a crazy conspiracy theory about Mr Megrahi’s conviction. Rather I have noted, among other things, that the Crown failed to disclose to Mr Megrahi’s defence team at least seven key items of exculpatory evidence; that two of the most important Crown witnesses were secretly paid millions of dollars by the US Government; and that the trial court’s judgment was, according to no less an authority than the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, unreasonable. All these facts Mr Linklater’s article omits to mention.

If Megrahi was framed – a big ‘if’, but not inconceivable given their extraordinary antics in the 1980s – it would almost certainly have been done by one of the US intelligence services, without the knowledge of the other protagonists listed by Mr Linklater. It is a matter of public record that during the Eighties the US National Security Council and CIA waged a massive covert campaign against Libya, which involved, among other things, spreading disinformation. During the same decade the same organisations made secret deals with the original prime suspect in the bombing, Iran. One of the Crown’s most important witnesses was revealed to be a CIA informant and prior to Lockerbie the CIA had at least one of the Swiss timing devices that the Libyans were alleged to have used to detonate the bomb. As my book revealed, new forensic evidence proves that the famous fragment of circuit board found within the bomb debris could not have been from one of the timers that, according to the undisputed Crown case, had been supplied to Libya. We don’t know the origin of the fragment, but it is by no means crazy to suggest that it was a plant. According to the head of the FBI’s Lockerbie investigation, Richard Marquise, his opposite number in the Swiss police believed this to be the case.  Indeed, Marquise admitted that this possibility also crossed his mind.

Whatever the truth about the fragment, in my view Mr Megrahi was convicted, not because of a grand conspiracy, but, primarily, because the police, Crown and judges, while no doubt all acting in good faith, failed to pursue the truth objectively. It’s a flaw to which newspaper columnists are equally vulnerable.

Yours sincerely …

 

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Jalil and the Sunday Express debunked

 

The following article appears on the front of today’s Scottish Sunday Express under the ludicrously overblown headline ‘Lockerbie: the truth at last‘. It reports on the latest claims of the leaders of Libya’s National Transitional Council and interim head of state Mustafa Abdul Jalil. As so often with the Sunday Express, the article recycles claims that are already in the public domain (the interview and was first reported last month) and when analysed in detail, is really thin stuff. My comments are in normal typeface.

 

THE head of the Libyan government has revealed his country’s true role in the Lockerbie bomber’s release in a sensational television interview.  Mustafa Abdul Jalil, who has been running the war-torn North African state since the downfall of Colonel Gaddafi last year, broke his silence to expose the contents of secret government files in Tripoli.

He revealed that Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi – the only man convicted of Britain’s worst ever terror atrocity – and his family were paid up to £15million in monthly installments to “buy his silence”. 

Jalil also disclosed that Megrahi was ordered to drop his appeal by Gaddafi, who was terrified he would “release critical and confidential information” and have his conviction overturned.

In addition, Jalil said the new regime would continue to work with Scottish and American investigators to “reopen past files that can deliver the truth”.

And, in a further astonishing claim, he suggested that Gaddafi deliberately blew up a Libyan passenger jet in 1992 in a ruthless tit-for-tat bid to frame the West.

Speaking to Dubai-based TV station Al Arabiya, Jalil – the head of the ruling National Transitional Council – said Megrahi was paid 150,000 Euros per month “to keep him quiet”.

If the payments ran from when he was handed over to Scottish police, in April 1999, to his release in August 2009, they would total 18.6million Euros – or £14.6million at today’s exchange rates. 

The fact that Abdelbaset’s family were paid by the government is no secret and hardly surprising. He was the main breadwinner of a family of five who, by the time he gave himself up for trial in 1999, had endured seven and a half years very difficult years. In agreeing to stand trial, Abdelbaset and Lamin Fhimah helped free the country from years of crippling sanctions. In that context, the figures cited are paltry, especially when compared to the billions spent by the Libyan government to settle the case. There is absolutely no evidence that the payments were to keep Abdelbaset quiet. If that was Gadafy’s aim, then surely Fhimah would also have been paid (in a newspaper interview last year he claimed that he had had to sell his farm because the government had left him financially high and dry). Alternatively, Gadafy could have had them both killed well before the trial was mooted.

In the interview, Jalil – who was also Gaddafi’s Justice Minister from 2007 to 2011 – said he had been “advised to keep away from cases linked to external affairs, and this includes the Lockerbie case”.

This is hardly surprising. As justice minister, he had responsibility for the domestic justice system, rather than international relations. Furthermore, Abdelbaset’s return to Libya in August 2009 effectively closed the case. It’s worth noting that Jalil’s successor as justice minister, Mohamed al-Alagi, who is now head of Libya’s human rights commission, has publicly stated that Abdelbaset is innocent.

He added: “However, I witnessed two things. First, the insistence of both Saif [al-Islam Gaddafi, the dictator’s son] and his father that I get back [Megrahi] by whatever means necessary…

“Meanwhile, the sentence was not completed and the appeal was getting closer.

“But the insistence of the country for Abdelbaset to waive his appeal and his fast return indicates the country was in a crisis, considering that the late Abdelbaset wanted to release critical and confidential information about Lockerbie.”

It’s not clear here whether the country referred to is Libya or Scotland. The only critical and confidential information that Abdelbaset sought the release of was held by the Crown Office and the UK authorities.

Megrahi’s decision to drop his appeal, just days before his release from prison, has always been shrouded in mystery – especially because he continued to protest his innocence right up until his death in May.

Jalil added: “The Libyans wanted him back as soon as possible, in return for the waiver of the appeal. If the appeal had persisted maybe some critical evidence that proved his innocence would have surfaced.

“And perhaps evidence that convicted him would have resurfaced as well. So, they preferred that he returns to Libya at this point to ensure that he does not reveal confidential information.”

Again, it’s unclear exactly what Jalil means (perhaps owing to poor translation). The Libyan government had no power to make abandonment of the appeal a condition of his release and had no interest in doing so. The appeal would not have produced any evidence of Libyan government involvement, because it was focused on the narrow issue of the safety of Abdelbaset’s conviction. There was no prospect of Abdelbaset revealing confidential information concerning Libyan government involvement in the bombing, firstly, because he almost certainly had none and, secondly, because, if he had, he would have both undermined his own appeal and jeopardised the safety of his family in Libya. 

However, he insisted he had been misquoted by a Swedish newspaper last year which claimed he had evidence that Gaddafi personally ordered the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which claimed 270 lives.

He said: “All I said then is what I say right now, which is that the regime was involved in this case, evident by insisting he returns and that they spent a lot of money on him while he was in jail.”

Really? Sounds like backpedalling to me.

Jalil also hinted at the existence of government files which could finally establish once and for all whether the bombing was the work of Megrahi and other Libyan agents, under orders from Gaddafi – or was in fact an Iranian-backed plot, as many campaigners believe.

He said: “We sympathize with the families of the innocent victims and we are willing to reopen past files that can deliver the truth.”

Megrahi, who developed terminal prostate cancer during eight years behind bars in Scotland, is known to have had a number of Swiss bank accounts, including one which allegedly held £1.8million at the time of his trial in 2000.

The £1.8 million claim originates from a Sunday Times article of 20 December 2009. In fact there is only evidence of one Swiss bank account, which was dormant from 1993 onwards, and had a balance of only $23,000. Had Abdelbaset given evidence at trial, he could have accounted for all the payments in and out of the account.

But the full extent of the fortune paid to ensure his silence will appal many of those who lost loved ones in December 1988.

However, campaigners calling for a public inquiry into Lockerbie said the new evidence supports claims that Megrahi was simply a well-paid “fall guy”.

Robert Black, Professor of Scots Law at the University of Edinburgh, said: “He was getting a lot of money because he had taken the fall for something he didn’t do.

“By surrendering himself for trial in Scotland he brought Libya under Gaddafi back into world commerce. That was something the Libyans thought worth paying for.”

This wrongly implies that Abdelbaset’s supporters believe that he took the rap for Gadafy. I’m not aware of any of his prominent supports, including Prof Black, who believe that to be the case.


Gaddafi ordered 1992 bombing

COLONEL Gaddafi may have deliberately blown up a passenger jet, killing 157, in a bizarre bid to frame the American and British governments and sue for compensation.

Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 1103 was involved in a mid-air collision with a Libyan MiG 23 fighter jet as it was approaching Tripoli Airport on December 22, 1992.

The fighter pilot and navigator safely ejected, but all of the Boeing 727’s passengers or crew were killed – including oil worker Victor Prazak, from London.

At the time, Gaddafi was under growing pressure to hand over the Lockerbie suspects and facing severe UN sanctions.

In his TV interview, current Libyan leader Mustafa Abdul Jalil said: “This trip was chosen on a day that coincides with the Lockerbie bombings and the flight number was almost identical.

“It was confirmed that the plane, going from Benghazi to Tripoli, was stuffed with explosives. It was given a new route deep into the sea, that no other plane has taken before.

“It was in the landing stages at Tripoli when, some say, it was intersected by another plane that bombed it.

“Nothing was left intact from the bombing.”

 I have not studied the case of LAA flight 1103, but find Jalil’s suggestion bizarre.

 

 

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Edinburgh International Book Festival

Dr Jim Swire, Prof Hans Köchler and I shall be doing a keynote session on the opening day of the Edinburgh International Book Festival, entitled Megrahi: A spectacular miscarriage of justice?  Saturday 11 August, 11.30 to 12.30, RBS main theatre, Charlotte Square Gardens. Tickets are available from 29 June and cost £10 and £8. The full festival programme, which was announced today, can be read here.

 

 

 

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